We are all hostages: Report from a prison of the polish military regime by Michnik, Adam
WE ARE ALL HOSTAGES' 
Report from a Prison 
of the Polish Military Regime1 
Adam Michnik* 
This war was not declared. In the course of a 
Saturday night in December, officials of the security 
system (Sicherheitsapparat) 1 hammered on our houses, 
broke the doors open with crowbars, came in swinging 
wildly, shot teargas in our eyes, put handcuffs on us, 
and led us away—as internees—to the prisons. We were 
the first prisoners in this war of the communist esta-
blishment against its own people. The action in the 
night was the first victorious battle of the General. 
This is how the resolution of the 9th Party Congress of 
the United Polish Workers* Party (PVAP—the communist 
party in Poland) concerning the incompatibility of the 
various official positions of leadership was to be 
realized. Jaruzelski, at the same time Defense 
Minister, Premier, and First Secretary of the Party, 
also became head of the "Military Council for National 
Deliverance", abbreviated WRONA. But wrona also means 
"the crow" in (Polish). The Poles will now forever as-
sociate the word with the ugly bird, with the carica-
ture of the eagle that ornaments the Polish national 
coat of arms. 
A future historical account will praise the preci-
sion of the attack, the perfect selection of the mo-
ment, and the able carrying-out of the action. The 
historians will describe til** consistency with which all 
the resistance of the enemy was broken, and the poets 
will sing praises to the great military triumphs of 
this army, which through its struggle achieved the vic-
tory in the streets of Danzig, in Warsaw factories, in 
steel mills, coal mines, and in the shipyards. General 
Jaruzelski increased the fame of the Polish military by 
occupying the Warsaw radio station and television sta-
tion along with the central telephone system building 
in one skillful maneuver. Truly, since the battle of 
King Sobieski near Vienna in 1683, none of our leaders 
have been able to claim such successes. Now the musi-
cians will compose symphonies, the painters will immor-
talize the victorious attacks, the film directors will 
shoot patriotic films, and all for the honor of the 
leaders of the December night. The Council of State 
will doubtlessly introduce a new medal—for partic-
ipation in the campaign of December 1981. 
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But we don't want to joke. Although the government 
propaganda strikes exactly such a tone, we want, even 
while still bewildered and shocked, to ask ourselves 
about the meaning of what has happened in Poland. For 
in the night of the 12th to 13th of December the com-
munist power elite began despairingly to defend its 
position as the ruling class, its power, and the priv-
ileges bound up with this power. The status of the 
power elite--one doesn't need to ground this in de-
tail—was being threatened, and indeed, not only in Po-
land, but in the entire communist block. The December-
Putsch didn't have so much to do with the aim of real-
izing the communist Utopia, but was rather a classic 
counter-revolution against the workers for the defense 
off the conservative interests of the anclen regime. 
Contrary to the official propaganda, this was in no way 
the response to an attempt to take over the political 
power: Solidarity had at its disposal neither a shadow 
cabinet nor a plan for a coup d'etat. 
The genesis of the December chaos begins with the 
fundamentally unresolvable conflicts between a mil-
lions-strong social movement organized in Solidarity 
and the totalitarian structure of a communist state. 
But the fact of the existence of an independent and 
self-administered institution supported by the people 
was unacceptable. The issue here wasn't, then, that of 
power itself, but authority (Machtvollkommenheit), and 
consequently, the limits of the party nomenclature, 
with the style of the exercise of power, and, there-
fore, with the rule of law, with the meaning of the 
compromises concluded between the governing and the 
governed—so, about pluralism in social life, about the 
structuring of self-administration in the factories and 
at other levels of social life. 
The realization of the reform program, which in-
cluded all these areas, put the fundamental principle 
of communist leadership over state and society in 
question. It was obvious that the power-structure 
(Apparat) wouldn't ever freely relinquish even a little 
bit of its power and the conflicts were consequently 
unavoidable. We thought, however, that matters would 
take a different course. We didn't believe that the 
power-structure (Machtapparat) would attempt to resolve 
social conflicts with military power by using the argu-
ment of power instead of the power of argument. 
This is not the first crisis in the history of the 
communist states. Nevertheless, anyone who compares 
those events which occured twelve years apart, first in 
1956, then the Prague Spring, and now the 15 months in 
Poland, can, despite some similarities, also see some 
significant differences. Common to each of these situ-
ations was the desire for an expansion of national and 
civil rights. The differences lay in the dynamic of 
the social changes. 
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In 1956 the impulse for reform came from Moscow, 
from the hall of the 20th Party Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, where the party bur-
eaucrats did away with the still present shadow of 
Stalin and pushed aside the axe that the security 
police held over their heads. The movements inside the 
party, which shook Poland and Hungary in 1956, too, had 
their origin in these developments. In Poland the 
authority of Gomulka, who had recently been released 
from prison, represented a satisfactory guarantee for 
both the Kremlin and the Polish people. For the 
Kremlin Gomulka was an obstinate communist, but one 
with whom they could nevertheless come to an under-
standing. For the Poles he was a spokesman for their 
national and democratic desires. In Hungary the oppo-
sition of the Stalinist wing in the power-structure 
(Apparat) led to a situation in which the revolution in 
the streets began to dictate the tempo of the changes. 
The power-strueture (Machtapparat) fell apart like a 
house of cards. The Soviet intervention was a direct 
consequence of this fact. 
In Czechoslovakia in 1968 it was a circle of the 
power-structure inside the party (Kreise des Apparats 
innerhalb der Partei) that noticed that the economic 
inefficiency of the communist system and its suscepti-
bility for waste and backwardness would increase unless 
there were deep conceptual reforms. The essense of the 
conflict in Czechoslovakia lay in the desire of the 
liberal and victorious faction of DubXek—which was 
supported by the entire society--for democratic reforms 
from above together with a lessening of the dependence 
on Soviet centralization. The Czechoslovak!an "social-
ism with a human face" had many faces: from a tempered 
reformism of the party machine (Apparatschiks) to a 
pluralistic vision of society, as could be found in the 
writings of nonconformist journalists. The determining 
factors, however, were the opposition of the 
Czechoslovak!an leaders to the dictates of the Soviets 
and their desire to seek the legitimation of their 
power in the support of their own society and not only 
in the official chambers of the Kremlin. 
It was different in Poland. It is hard to speak of 
a "socialism with a human face" here; it was previously 
a "communism with its teeth knocked out", a communism 
which could no longer bite and defend itself against 
the assault of organized society. This social presure 
had nothing to do with the use of force. Contrary to 
the hysterical explanations about "open counter-re-
volution" and the "fascist terror in the factories", no 
one was killed in the Polish revolution, not a drop of 
blood was shed. Many observors ask the question, "how 
is this to be explained?" 
The development of the Polish reform movement—or 
the Polish self-limiting-revolution (sich-Selbst-be-
schraenkenden Revolution)--had its origin outside the 
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institutions of the official public life. For many 
years groups of a democratic opposition have existed 
and operated in Poland, groups which were widely sup-
ported by broad circles of public opinion and protected 
by the effective umbrella of the Church. Under the 
relatively tolerant course of the Gierek regime 
(Gierek-Eguipe)—a tolerance that, by the way, devel-
oped because of connections with the West and political 
weakness and not exactly out of a spirit of political 
liberalism—attempts were undertaken for self-help and 
social self-defense, an independent intellectual life 
was organized, and uncensored scenarios were sketched 
of a struggle for freedom. 
The central point of the program of these op-
position circles—the most popular of which was the 
"Committee for the Defense of the Workers" (KOR), which 
was formed after the strikes in June 1976—lay in the 
desire to change the society and to rebuild social con-
nections outside the official structures. The central 
question wasn't, "how can one reform the system of the 
use of power?", but, "how can one defend oneself from 
this system?" 
This way of thinking effected the course of the 
August strikes, the form of the strike demands, the 
program, and the strategy and tactics of Solidarity. 
The passionate struggle for the reform of the totali-
tarian structure lasted 15 months. The high point of 
the struggle was as equally untypical as its course. 
The official declaration of war on the society stemmed 
from the nature of the preceeding conditions. War, ac-
cording to Clauseqitz, is the continuation of the 
politics pursued in peacetime with other means. This 
time it was a war against the organized society taken 
up by a state which is an instrument of the organized 
political power of the Warsaw Pact. The analysis of 
the mistakes which Solidarity made will long remain a 
topic of Pölich political discussions. For the people 
and a woman—to recall the appropriate formula from 
Karl Marx--will the moment of neglectfulness never be 
forgotten in which they allowed a scoundrel to rule 
them. 
The union, actually a front for national soli-
darity, bore in itself the good and bad sides of that 
society which gave birth to it; a society which for 37 
years has lived estranged from every democratic insti-
tution and outside the sphere of political culture; a 
society which was systematically lied to, stultified, 
and humiliated; a society which is at the same time ob-
stinate and deliberate, in which honor, freedom, and 
solidarity have the highest values and compromise is 
all too frequently equated with capitulation and being 
a renegade. 
Solidarity was a democratic movement of the world 
of the workers, which functioned in an anti-democratic 
environment, inside the totalitarian structure of a 
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system whose only understandable legitimation lay in 
the agreements of the Yalta Conference. The Poles 
don't need to be reminded on the contents of these 
agreements, as Mr. [Henri] Nannen* did recently, who 
seems to think that human rights are due only to those 
who live west of the Elba, while the whip and barbed-
wire remain reserved as appropriate instruments to reg-
ulate the mechanisms of public life for the barbarians 
of the east. The Poles haven't forgotten Yalta. The 
problem nevertheless existed of how to translate the 
realities of Yalta into a contemporary language. That 
was not simple. 
The powerful, spontaneous social movement, which 
shaped itself from one day to the next without a model 
and in the middle of on-going conflicts with the power-
structure (Machtapparat) had no unequivocal, well-
defined stage-by-stage goals and no clear conception a-
bout coexistence with the communist regime. It allowed 
itself to be easily provoked into discussions about 
unimportant things and there existed many superfluous 
conflicts within it, much disorder, inefficiency, and a 
lack of knowledge of the opponent and his methods of 
action. 
Solidarity could strike, but it couldn't wait. It 
had a command of the techniques of direct attack, but 
not that of retreat. It had fundamental ideas, but no 
program for stage-by-stage actions. It was a Collossus 
on steel feet, but with hands of clay. It was powerful 
in the factories, inside the workers' groups, but help-
less at the bargaining table. It had an opponent which 
wasn't in the position to tell the truth, to hold the 
economy in gear, or even to fulfill its own obliga-
tions, but which could do one thing: smash the social 
solidarity to pieces. It had learned this art to per-
fection in its 37 years in power. 
This opponent—the power-elite—was morally and 
financially bankrupt, and was, because of its political 
weakness, incapable of realizing any political program. 
This political weakness was understood by Solidarity as 
a general weakness, whereby one forgot that an appar-
atus of power (Apparat der Gewalt), untroubled by dem-
ocratic corrosion, can be a useful instrument in the 
hands of a dictatorial power, and above all in the 
hands of a dictatorship which finds itself in hot 
water. 
The communist system in Poland was a Collussus on 
clay feet, but with iron hands. When they demanded 
democratic elections of the parliament and the people's 
councils, the officials of Solidarity seemed to forget 
that such slogans set off an alarm signal in the ruling 
class and announced their soon-to-come end. We repeat: 
Solidarity never demanded that the communists be ex-
pelled from the government and that the State be re-
placed with the administrative structure of the union 
(Gewerkschaftsapparat). Nevertheless, it is a problem 
222 
that the governing cliques (Apparatschiks) read such a 
program into the declarations of Solidarity—but it is 
now unimportant to what extent it must have been so. 
They noticed the pressure of the political base 
(Drang der Basis) to disolve the party committees in 
the factories; the specter of the elections for the 
people's councils frightened them; they had nightmares 
about [the possibility of] a national referendum con-
cerning the form of self-administration; and they saw 
that a drastic raising of prices was due. Their 
response to all of this was the coup of December, the 
last response at their disposal. Solidarity didn't ex-
pect a military coup and was taken completely by 
surprise. The workers' groups don't carry the respon-
sibility for this, but all those who, like the author, 
were called upon on the basis of their intellectual ac-
tivities to form the political vision of the union, do. 
The theoretical reflections—this only as a paren-
thetical comment—on the topic of changing the system 
limped along behind the events. Except for on-going 
slogans there was hardly any political reflection. 
Praxis finally overtook theory—and not for the first 
time in the history of Poland. 
The fundamental, if also never clearly defined, 
conflict within Solidarity concerned the tempo of the 
changes and their extent. At the beginning the ad-
herants of a compromise solution were in the majority, 
but in time it became obvious that the power-structure 
(Machtapparat) interpreted every inclination to com-
promise as a weakness. Every concession had to be ex-
torted through strikes or the threat of strikes. 
The constant strikes, skillfully provoked by the 
power-structure (Machtapparat), wore down the society, 
which was exhausted by the difficulties of every day 
life. Positive results in the form of detectable im-
provements in the quality of life didn't appear and 
this led to polarization and put the meaning of this 
tactic in question. One group would say: "No more 
strikes, that accomplishes nothing." The other said: 
"No more ineffective strikes, we need a general strike, 
which will force the government to essential con-
cessions." It is hard to say which group was the 
largest, but it is certain that the second group was 
the most vocal. And exactly that group, mostly young 
workers from large factories, demanded radical action 
from the leadership of Solidarity, which became harder 
and harder to hinder (although Walesa and Kuron at-
tempted to do this). 
The power structure (Machtapparat) was scorned more 
and more and not taken very seriously. Almost no one 
believed that it might be possible to use Polish sol-
diers to attack Polish workers; almost no one believed 
in the possibility of a military coup. The fundamental 
reasons for this were naivete and wishful thinking—and 
also the long tradition of Polish history. Ac-
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cordingly, the attempt to terrorize Polish society with 
the help of the Polish army seemed hardly imaginable. 
The proceeding months had fixed in the public con-
sciousness a pattern of the development of the con-
flicts between state and society in which there was no 
place for an open victory. The plans for gallows and 
detention lists existed only in the sick imaginations 
of the party notables. 
The union knew only one response to the attack of 
the government: an occupation strike. This tactic was 
rendered ineffective when the army stormed the fac-
tories. But the consciousness of the futility of 
peaceful forms of resistance can have catastrophic con-
sequences. The blood shed by the mine workers from the 
mine "Wujek" can become a constructive lesson in the 
kind of language one must use with the government if 
one wants to achieve something. 
What did the communists think of Solidarity? The 
August crisis was no surprise to them, although the 
course of the strikes, the maturity of the demands, the 
discipline and solidarity of the workers' groups 
shocked them. For the Gierek regime, which came to 
power on the wave of the bloody uprising of the dock 
workers in 1970, it was a dogma to avoid an armed con-
frontation with the working-class. The recognition of 
an independent union in 1980 was an act of desperation 
accompanied by the belief that it might be possible to 
limit this movement to the coast of the Baltic and 
eventually manipulate and destroy it from within. Vlhen 
the wave of strikes in August then forced the re-
cognition of a unified union at the national level, the 
power-structure (Apparat) could only hope to wear it 
down with provocations and to split it from within. 
Solidarity presented a deadly threat—it dissolved 
(liquidierte) the fundamental principle of communist 
ideology that the communist party represents the work-
ing class. 
The plan to destroy the union with "political 
means" failed. However, the constant conflicts—over 
political prisoners, free Saturdays, and the registra-
tion of the farmers' union--just like the personality 
conflicts, inspired from outside, weakened the union. 
But in no way did this improve the situation of the 
power-structure (Apparat): for it, already hopelessly 
divided and poisoned by the struggle for power, there 
arose a predominating problem--the party. 
The party, understood as the organized community of 
its members, was not at all present during the August 
strikes. This instrument, which in earlier times was 
useful to the power-structure (Apparat) as a means to 
break down the social solidarity, had itself broken 
down this time. In its attempt to bring the party back 
to life the power-structure (Apparat) actually opened 
up the proverbial Pandora's Box. On the one hand, 
there was the attempt to find a scapegoat, which led to 
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the publicizing of the ever more shocking proofs of 
corruption in the Gierek regime. On the other hand, 
party members began to turn their membership cards in, 
or worse yet, to integrate themselves into the "struc-
ture of the bases" (Basis-Strukturen), which demanded 
the democratic reform of the party, a cancelling 
(Aufhebung) of the Stalinist model that the power-
structure (Apparat) had used to defend its position of 
absolute power. 
In this situation we can finally see the fundamen-
tal differences between the recent events in Poland and 
the crises of the years 1956 and 1968. Then the com-
munist leaders (Nagy, Gomulka, Dubceck) were in the po-
sition to gain for themselves the trust of the society; 
those in the group who favored party reform from above 
had public support at their disposal. But in Poland 
the entire party dragged itself along behind the 
changes. The party didn't stimulate the changes in 
society; it was instead a social movement outside the 
party (PVAP) that brought changes in the party line. 
The reform program of the party was—from the per-
spective of the goals of Solidarity--a crass an-
achronism. 
The party reformers in Poland formed no unified 
camp. Among the people who were designated as reform-
ers were such different individuals as Andrzej Werblan, 
one of the ideological dictators in the era of Gomulka 
and Gierek, the well-known journalist Stefan Bratkow-
ski, one of the organizers of the discussion circle 
"Experience and Future" and chairman of the journal-
ists' union, Wojciech Lamentowicz, a 36-year old scien-
tific fellow in the party school, and Abigniew Iwanow, 
party secretary and leader of the August strikes in a 
factory in Torun. 
But despite their differences, they all became sac-
rifices to the paradox that belongs to the fate of com-
munist reformers throughout the world: they demanded 
the reform of a totalitarian party in the name of human 
freedom and social justice--against the- bureaucratic 
structure (Apparat) which supresses freedom of thought 
and creativity and prefers mediocrity and corruption. 
For this reason they could only attack the power-
structure (Apparat) effectively if they organized a 
collective movement, but not in a faction which fought 
over the power. As a faction they automatically hung 
on outside the party and were additionally compelled to 
use in daily political battles the same practices which 
they sharply criticized when used by opponents. The 
"base-structures" (Basisstrukturen) of individual party 
cells were an attempt to solve the problem of the 
squaring of the circle. But they were too weak to suc-
ceed and wholly unacceptable to the power-structure 
(Apparat); they couldn't hold together against the 
massive counter-attack of the conservative structure of 
the party. 
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The Polish party reformers of this last era showed 
themselves to be caricatures of the spiritual fathers 
and older brothers from the Polish October and the 
Prague Spring. Their reformism seemed to be less ab-
stract and rooted more in everyday life. It contained 
no dogged debates over the philosophy of the young 
Marx, but, instead of this, discussions over economic 
reform. But nothing turned on discussions about begin-
nings. This movement found no support in the everyday 
discussions of the people over the reforms. It was at 
the same time a descendant and the final stage of the 
ideal destruction process of real communism. The 
people helped themselves to an ordinary language way of 
talking about things, while the ideas of the party 
reformers remained hanging in the tongs of Marxist-
Leninist Newspeak. For the party reformers the central 
question was, "how can one democratize the party?", 
what should be the key to the democratization of the 
party? For the people the central question was, "how 
can one snatch away as many spheres of public life as 
possible from the dictatorship of the party nomen-
clature?" 
The party structure (Parteiapparat) accused Sol-
idarity of being a political party and not a union. 
Solidarity suggested to the PVAP that it should develop 
into a political party which might struggle for credi-
bility in the society instead of persisting to stand 
still in the position of union of the members of the 
power structure (Machtapparat). This was the most pre-
cise definition of the social character of the ruling 
communist party. And that was decisive. The demo-
cratic course of the 9th Party Congress of the PVAP 
changed little of this—for the people who were 
selected in a democratic way for the highest positions 
were already compromised, including Albin Siwak, who 
should be presented as a Polish Stacanow*, a model 
worker with the identification papers of the security 
police in his pocket. With the Siwaks in the Politburo 
the PVAP couldn't count on being considered credible by 
the people. The new leadership and the ratified pro-
gram of the Party Congress were still-born. The power-
structure (Apparat) could now only hope for a split 
within the union and for the mediating role of the 
Church. 
This is exactly what they built on. The idea was 
for a Front of National Understanding, the pillars of 
which should have been the power-structure (Macht-
apparat), the Church, and Solidarity, which was sym-
bolised by the meeting between Jaruzelski, Primas 
Glemp, and Walesa. That was the last attempt to out-
maneuver the union "without bloodshed". The Catholic 
Church, the greatest moral authority in Poland--and 
additionally strengthened because of a Polish Pope--was 
inclined without doubt to a compromise solution. It 
endeavoured to build bridges for an agreement, to sub-
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due tensions, and to be a moderating influence on both 
the power-structure (Machtapparat) and Solidarity. 
But it should have been a compromise, not a renun-
ciation by the union of its principles and goals. For 
the common lists suggested by the power-structure 
(Machtapparat) for the September 1981 municipal elec-
tions represented nothing else but such a renun-
ciation—a solution which the Church couldn't and 
didn't want to support. That was the turning point. 
For the union it became clear that conflict was unav-
oidable; to the power-structure of the state (Staats-
macht) it seemed obvious that the possibility of a com-
promise had been taken as far as it could be. 
One must concede that the action taken in the night 
of December, to which the total unscrupulousness of its 
executors had contributed, went off perfectly. With 
tanks and bayonets the union was "pacified", the resis-
tance of the workers in the factories was broken. This 
triumph of the power-structure (Apparat) can, however, 
have unexpected consequences. It could become proof of 
political short-sightedness. With a bayonet one can 
spread fear, terrorize, kill and strike victorious 
blows against an unarmed people. But one sits badly on 
a bayonet--a thought from Talleyrand that Stefan 
Bratkowski used to quote. And with a bayonet, we add, 
one can't pick out the memory of 15 months of freedom 
from the people. 
We have already looked for an answer to the 
question of how the state power (Staatsmacht) was able 
to break the resistance in such a short time. Besides 
the shock of surprise and the conviction that the 
spilling of blood is a barrier for all Poles that 
shouldn't be stepped over, there was still another fac-
tor that determined the course of events: the shadow 
of Russia. The problem of Soviet intervention was of-
ten discussed. Press reports confirmed daily the un-
mistakeable intentions of Moscow. We knew that Sol-
idarity was not loved in the Kremlin. 
There were conflicts over the assessment of the in-
tentions of Soviet policy, which in the Afghanistan 
conflict was involved in internal difficulites and a 
complicated international game. There was no clarity 
in this. Some of us quietly pursued the hope that it 
might be possible to create a model Polish-Soviet 
relationship in which a place might be given for Poland 
as a free state (als Subjekt). We also believed that 
the Soviet Union would only decide in favor of armed 
intervention in an extreme situation, in the event of a 
civil war or an attempt to take over pov/er. We were of 
the opinion that those who held power in Poland had 
hastily used the frightful picture of the Soviets in 
order to achieve the psychological affect of an inter-
vention without an intervention. 
The course of events proves that these considera-
tions were rational: the Soviet Union did everything 
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possible to conceal its participation in the December 
coup. The scenario that it played from was optimal in 
the view of the Soviets: "the Poles have made a solu-
tion to their problems for themselves". [But] the de-
claration of a state of war must have reminded the 
people of the Targowica, one of the dirtiest symbols of 
national shame. (The Confederation of Targowica decid-
ed against the constitutional reforms of 1792 and 
called on Russian troops for help, which led to the 
Second Partition of Poland.)' The frightening specter 
of Soviet intervention in the event that Jaruzelski was 
defeated determined the behaviour of the Poles. I risk 
this hypothesis in the conviction that it might be a 
further argument for how great the stock of rational 
ideas and healthy human reason is in this romantic 
people, a further argument that the Poles can't only 
fight, but can also think. 
No one in Poland counted on help from the West, so 
the strong reaction of v/estern public opinion and gov-
ernments is a rather pleasant surprise. This echo 
gives us courage and in time can also contribute to re-
straining the wave of repression. The indignation of 
world public opinion has an important moral dimension, 
because it emphasizes that democratic values are not 
divisible, that these values have their defenders all 
over the world, and that they don't cease to have value 
when they are trampled on by soldiers' boots. For men 
who are imprisioned or being persecuted this is an in-
jection of hope, a true light in that gloomy tunnel 
which represents every day life in Poland under martial 
law. 
The actions of governments have their political 
dimensions. They are a piece of the larger interna-
tional strategy in which the Polish question is only an 
episode. One shouldn't have any illusions that it is 
otherwise. But one element of this strategy-~the de-
mand for economic sanctions—merits closer consider-
ation. I don't know what President Reagan's motives 
were. I doubt that the announced sanctions were an ex-
pression of his anger that Solidarity wasn't successful 
in restoring capitalism in Poland—as the official 
propoganda in Poland claimed. If that were the case, 
Reagan must be pretty weak-minded. 
I believe that the sanctions are a response of the 
West to the military coup that everyone could have ex-
pected and the responsibility for the consequences 
falls back on the organizers of the coup. Jaruzelski 
and the military council, not Reagan or the Pentagon, 
bear the guilt for the catastrophic consequences of the 
sanctions on Polish families. The economies of the 
communistic states cannot manage without western tech-
nology and raw materials because they are dependent 
upon them. Nor do great amounts of credit serve uncon-
ditionally as factors for the acceleration of reform— 
the case of Gierek teaches much in this respect. And 
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it is even less likely to reform an economy with the 
help of bayonets, denunciations, and policemen. As a 
consequence, the credit has also fallen into the dust. 
What wonder that this is not a very encouraging per-
spective for the West. Can one blame the western pol-
iticians that they would like to have a Polish govern-
ment for a partner that had at least a minimum of cred-
ibility with its own people? That they make the grant-
ing of further credit dependent upon a restoration of 
civil rights in Poland? 
The official propaganda attempts to portray the 
sanctions as an attack against the existence of the Po-
lish people. It claims that the sanctions hinder dem-
ocratic reforms and will damage Polish sovereignty. I 
am not an advocate of sanctions, but it is sheer cowar-
dice to push the responsibility away from oneself in 
the matter of who is to blame for the sanctions. It 
wasn't Reagan who ruined the Polish economy, but those 
who put their own narrow, selfish interests before the 
spiritual and material fate of the Polish people. What 
has to happen before these people understand that they 
only isolate themselves from their own people and the 
entire civilized world by the destruction of indepen-
dent institutions with the application of the methods 
of a military-police dictatorship? 
What does the future hold for Poland? Every even-
ing conversation in Poland turns on the answer to this 
question and the discussions continue despite the even-
ing curfew. In the night from the 12th to 13th of De-
cember the ruling communists returned to their original 
status of 1945--to the position of a relatively small 
sect which depends on the bayonet for its power. It 
was at that time a sect of pro-Soviet Jacobins; today 
it is a sect of pro-Soviet Mandarins. Then they de-
fended their program; today they defend their privi-
leges. 
Historical experience suggests two different models 
for the resolution of such crises. The first we under-
stand under the name KadäV, the second with the name 
Husa'k. Janos Husak in Hungary began his excercise of 
power in 1956 as a Soviet state holder who depended up-
on Soviet tanks. The first years of his reign were 
marked with a cruel policy of repression, which fol-
lowed a slow "tightening of the screws" from above. 
Gustav Husak in the CSSR declared from the beginning 
his intentions to continue the "Prague Spring". After 
the Soviet intervention all the previously established 
institutions of public life that had been founded still 
functioned at first. But the process of their dissolu-
tion continued very slowly. The people were forced to 
humiliating self-criticism and to the denunciation of 
their colleagues at work. "Extremist elements" were 
shut off, independent institutions were dissolved—and 
all this under the pretext that at least the rest of 
the work of the reforms had to be saved. In this way 
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the "Prague Spring" was murdered by the hands of its 
creators. 
The KadäTr model is the way from a socially destruc-
tive repressive action to the policies of a paternal-
from a fictitous continuation of democratic structures 
to a total sterilization of the public life. Kadar is 
a positive hero for the Polish communists, whose way 
they would gladly repeat. Judicial judgments are ac-
companied with claims that the program of renewal and 
reforms is being continued. The scenario of actions is 
already discernible: Solidarity must be eradicated, 
the totalitarian institutions must be capable of func-
tioning again, and the hope of a life v/orth living must 
be eliminated from the hearts of the people. 
Solidarity is to be eliminated with the hands of 
its previous leaders, who—broken and humiliated—have 
signed declarations of loyalty. The agents of the mil-
itary council tried hard to move Walesa to the accept-
ance of such a plan. They had no success. A Sol-
idarity without Walesa, Bujak, Slowik could only be a 
dummy, which would only conceal anti-worker policies—a 
broadly constructed action of political repression, 
limited by the protests of Polish and international pu-
blic opinion, including the "pacification" of the fac-
tories, the arrest of union officials, and a propagan-
dists slander campaign. At the same time, statements 
will be made repeatedly that everything is in order, 
that the situation in Poland from day to day is more 
normal. 
But words of truth about the state of the nation 
resound from the pulpits of the churches—the only 
place where the language hasn't been contaminated. 
They speak of repression and of actions to help the 
victims. One learns in other places that there is re-
sistance. Illegal newspapers are being published; in-
dependent institutions are being reestablished. No, 
this movement is not going to be subjugated. Here, in 
my new "at home", which is watched over by armed men in 
uniforms and secured by bars and barbed wire, only bits 
and pieces of news from Poland and the world get 
through. But there is more time to put the pieces 
together. 
These 15 months were a lesson in freedom. One can 
wash "Solidarity" from the facades of the houses, but 
not from the memory of the people. How often the 
guiding character (der wegweisende Charakter) of the 
Polish political experience has been emphasized, this 
political struggle without bloodshed or the use of 
physical force--a struggle which existed in the reesta-
blished social bonds outside the official structure! 
This model will function once again under different 
conditions; it can prove to be useful not only for 
Poland, but also in other societies of this geo-
political zone. 
istic liberalism. The model leads in contrast 
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But one should also keep in mind that the mechanism 
of the Polish coup d'etat can also serve as guidepost 
(Wegweiser). Until now there was never a time when a 
military elite held the power in a communist system. 
Ordinarily the party machine (parteiapparat) itself was 
such a power and—in times of intensified terror—the 
state security police. The military had value only as 
an instrument and if it made an attempt to become the 
acting power, it was eliminated. The fate of the So-
viet marshalls Tuchatschewski and Schukow seem to be 
rather convincing in this respect. 
The Polish military coup can thus become a prec-
edent. There is value in considering the hypothesis 
that perhaps when Jaruzelski took up the task of wiping 
out Solidarity he didn't, whether he wanted to or not, 
also make the power of the party machine (Macht des 
Parteiapparats) into a fiction. Until now it was the 
party machine which ruled, while the army served as its 
armed right-hand man. Perhaps it is the case today 
that the military power-structure (Militaerapparat) 
rules and the party forms only a facade for the exer-
cise of power. 
A military coup is one of the techniques for chang-
ing society. It is a form which doesn't necessarily 
determine the content. With a military coup a military 
dictatorship was founded in Chile, but in Portugal a 
military coup opened up the way to democracy. The mil-
itary, the only more or less sovereign institution 
(Struktur) over against the party and the security ap-
paratus in a communist system, can play different 
roles. An army, which, for example, is involved in the 
unpopular war against the courageous Afghani folk 
(which Karl Marx in the 19th century called the "Poland 
of Asia") can play an entirely different role than in 
Poland, which the Polish example itself can paradoxi-
cally be used to show. 
Here, behind bars, every gesture of human soli-
darity, is like a breath of fresh air. For this, I, in 
my own name and that of my colleagues, am heartfully 
thankful. Every good report helps. However, there are 
moments that are more difficult. When, for example, a 
German Social Democrat gives assurances that the situa-
tion for the internees is satisfactory and thereby ap-
peals to the words of the Vicepremier of the People'3 
Republic of Poland |RakolowskiJ, then I must with bit-
terness think on the fate of German Social Democrats of 
45 years ago and the assurances of different foreign 
statements that everything is "okay" in Germany, that 
the opponents of peace and order were being humanely 
treated. A ruling Vicepremier who steps forward as an 
expert in the matters of his arrested opponents is a 
grotesque and lamentable figure—his German partner in 
conversation is either cynical or naive.' 
A few words about the internees. We are prisoners 
without an arrest warrant from a prosecutor. Each of 
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us is free to go at any time he's prepared to sign a 
loyalty oath and to play the role of a police confi-
dant. A broken man, according to the conviction of our 
guards, is no longer capable of resistance. All of 
us—workers, farmers, intellectuals—are hostages. Our 
fate should be a warning for other colleagues, our 
status a calling card for foreign lands, and we our-
selves shall be an exchange token. Worse things are 
reserved for those who were sentenced because of par-
ticipation in strikes. 
As everyone else, we have also entered into a new 
situation because of the "Polish-Jaruzelski War", as 
its called in the Warsaw venacular. It is difficult 
today to come to a unified formula for action. Every-
one must answer the question before his own conscience 
of how he is to oppose such evil. Only each of us 
alone can decide how he is to defend the dignity of 
man, how he will act in this strange war, which—one 
must constantly remind himself of this—is a new incar-
nation of the centuries old battle between truth and 
falsehood, between freedom and the use of force, 
between dignity and humiliation. 
We repeat, therefore, that in this war there is in-
deed no final victory, but also no final defeat—and in 
this belief there is a precious bit of optimism. The 
belief that there can be no final defeat has moved me 
to write out these reflections. This is my contribu-
tion in this war. I will certainly not be able to speak 
my mind so soon again. For this reason I wish my 
friends, most of all those persecuted and struggling, 
much strength, so that they can walk boldly through the 
darkness that lies between hope and despair. 
And also much patience, so that they can learn the 
difficult art of forgiveness. 
NOTES 
'Title supplied to a manuscript smuggled out of 
Poland and published in the German newsweekly Der 
Spiegel (March 8, 1982, pp. 128-132) by the editors of 
the German publication; Copyright 1982 Per Spiegel. 
Translated by Jon Mark Mikkelsen, with the friendly as-
sistance and helpful criticism of Herrn Fritz Seitz, 
Tuebingen, W. Germany. 
'As an introduction to the essay and by way of sug-
gesting its philosophical and historical significance, 
it is appropriate to provide some information about the 
author. The 35 year-old Michnik is the son of Helen 
Michnik, historian and medieval specialist and Ozjasz 
Szechter, who was an active figure in the communist 
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movement in Poland before the second world war. 
Szechter was imprisoned many times during this period 
and after the war worked as an editor in the Warsaw 
party publishing house "Book and Knowledge". He, along 
with others, helped prepare the Polish translation of 
Das Kapital. As a 15 year-old student in the Warsaw 
Batory Gymnasium, Michnik, along with his friends, took 
advantage of the freedom of the immediate post-
Stalinist period and founded the "Club of the Con-
tradiction Seekers"; during this same period . he also 
came to know Jacek Kuron, who was his group-leader in 
the communist youth organization, the Pathfinders. 
Active in the opposition student moveranet of the 
1960's, Michnik studied under Leszek Kolakowski. As a 
leader of the "Polish March" in 1968, he, like 
Kolakowski, was forced to leave the university and was 
subsequently sentenced to a three-year prison term. He 
has been arrested more than 30 times and was allowed to 
travel in western Europe in 1976 only because of the 
intervention of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
We recognize that Michnik's text is understandably 
polemical and not strictly philosophical, but we feel 
that it merits publication in this journal not only as 
our own "contribution" to what Michnik refers to as the 
need to "defend the dignity of man . . . in this 
strange war" which has existed in Poland since the 13th 
of December 1981, but also for the light it may shed 
for an understanding of contemporary and future philo-
sophical movements in eastern Europe in a period when 
the former dreams of Eurocommunism seem to have all 
died. When compared to the western-oriented military 
regimes that currently rule or have ruled in Turkey or 
Argentina, or even many of the paper-democracies of 
Central America, or in the Phillipines, or even South 
Korea, it might well be the case that the Jaruzelski 
regime has achieved a kind of "totalitarianism with a 
human face" if not the "Socialism with a human face" 
dreamed of in eastern Europe two decades ago. But that 
Michnik has given up on the possibility of reconciling 
the ideals of the humanistic Marxism of the 1960's with 
the political structure of the communist states of 
eastern Europe must surely not be doubted after reading 
this document. 
Further information on Michnik's life and career 
can be found in the brief article which accompanied 
this text in the same issue of Per Spiegel ("Adam 
Michnik: Mehr Freiheit fuer Polen 1 1, pp. 124-127); 
additional information on the current philosophical 
situation in eastern Europe is also available in two 
recent issues of Telos (Spring 1981 and Spring 1982). 
'As no clear equivalents exist in English for the 
terminology used in the German text to describe the 
political hierarchy of the communist governments of 
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eastern Europe, the German expressions have been in-
cluded in parenthesis. 
"An editor of the more popular German newsweekly 
Stern. 
5Stacanow was a "model worker" of the post-war 
Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. 
'Explanation of the Targowica in parenthesis sup-
plied by the German editors of Der Spiegel. 
7Rakolowski 1s contrasting account of the events in 
Poland can be found in an extensive interview published 
in Stern (January 3, 1982, pp. 12-21). This account is 
accompanied by a sympathetic editorial written by Henri 
Nannen. 
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